from Davis, Diekmann, and Tinsley (1994) suggested that institutional factors caused decreased use of the conglomerate form of organization in the 1980s-the very idea of this form was no longer legitimate. One explanation for these inconsistent results is that there are varying market and institutional conditions under which divergent organizational change occurs. Earlier conceptual and later empirical work in neo-institutional theory (e.g., Scott and Meyer, 1983; Dacin, 1997) has emphasized that organizational fields vary in both the relative strength and heterogeneity of institutional and market pressures they hold for organizations. Thus, prior studies may yield different explanations for divergent organizational change because they examined organizational fields that differ in the kinds of market and institutional forces that affect them. In this paper, we formulate and test hypotheses on the effects of both market and institutional forces on divergent organizational changes, using data on the organizational field of rural hospitals between 1984 and 1991.
DIVERGENT ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE The Role of Market Forces
Divergent organizational change is more likely to occur within organizational fields that have strong, local market forces and strong, but heterogeneous, institutional forces. Organizations face strong, local market forces to the extent that there is low local demand for their products and services and intense local competition from similar organizations. Prior research suggests that competition among similar organizations is more intense at local levels than at population levels (Zucker, 1989; Hannan and Carroll, 1992: 146; Baum, 1996) . Low local demand for organizations' products and services and intense competition among similar organizations at the local level lead to divergent change as less-fit competitors move out of a market in search of alternatives to their current templates (Hawley, 1950: 201-203 ; Delacroix, Swaminathan, and Solt, 1989; Amburgey, Kelly, and Barnett, 1993; Haveman, 1993; Greve, 1998) . Organizations that hold favorable positions relative to their competitors in such markets can perform well enough to maintain their status quo (Greve, 1996) . In contrast, organizations that have comparative disadvantages in key areas, such as size or product mix, need to make substantial changes in templates as they seek domains in which they can hold a competitive advantage Freeman, 1977, 1989 ; Baum and Haveman, 1997).
Demand. Insufficient consumer demand for organizations' products and services is an important cause of divergent organizational change. Local markets with high consumer demand may promote convergent change, because organizations might have adequate resources to adopt forms and practices from successful competitors (Hawley, 1968) . In contrast, markets with low levels of local consumer demand are likely to promote divergent change because these markets cannot support all of the organizations that are operating with the same or similar resource needs. Kraatz and Zajac (1996) found, for example, that less consumer demand for traditional liberal arts degrees was significantly related to 680/ASQ, December 2000 divergent changes in the curricula of liberal arts colleges. Thus, we hypothesize: Hi: The lower the level of demand in an organization's local market, the more likely it is to make a divergent change.
Geographic distance between competitors. Results from several empirical studies show that the addition of an organization to a population has stronger competitive effects on neighboring organizations than on those that are more distant (Baum and Singh, 1994a, 1994b; Hannan et al., 1995; Lomi, 1995; Baum and Haveman, 1997) . This means that organizations that have similar products and services and are located in close proximity in local markets will face relatively strong competition, because they are trying to attract the same limited pool of consumers. As a result, competition in a local market increases the likelihood that one or more of the proximate organizations will perform poorly and will thus need to make a divergent change to differentiate itself from competitors and escape more losses. Thus, we hypothesize: H2: The closer the geographic distance between an organization and its closest market competitors, the more likely that the organization will make a divergent change.
Size relative to competitors. The size of organizations relative to competitors in their local market is likely to influence which of them will be unsuccessful and thus be forced to search for an alternative template. Specifically, there is likely to be a competitive disadvantage for organizations that are relatively smaller than their local counterparts (Baum, 1996) . This disadvantage appears to result, at least in part, from the superior ability of larger organizations to acquire resources that are needed to produce goods and services efficiently and effectively (Aldrich and Auster, 1986) . For example, compared with larger organizations in their market area, small organizations will have more difficulty both in raising capital to purchase technology and in hiring specialized personnel. Thus, we hypothesize: H3: Organizations that are smaller than their market competitors are more likely to make divergent changes.
Service and product mix relative to competitors. Services and products differ along several dimensions, including quality, selection, and price, that make them more or less attractive to customers. In general, organizations that produce goods and services that are more attractive than those produced by their otherwise similar competitors are likely to be winners in head-to-head competition for customers in local markets (Greve, 1996) . As a result, organizations with a relative edge in product and service offerings will be able to maintain their status quo, while losers must differentiate themselves and seek alternatives. We hypothesize: H4: Organizations that have disadvantages in services and products relative to local market competitors are more likely to make divergent changes.
The Role of Institutional Forces Organizations face strong, heterogeneous, institutional forces to the extent that their external environments consist of influential but diverse regulations, norms, and cognitive models (Scott, 1995) . Divergent organizational change occurs, by definition, when an organization abandons an institutionalized template. Such change is possible when an organizational field has heterogeneous institutional elements that are inconsistent with the dominant model; these conditions give organizations some discretion-they are less locked in to their current templates (Oliver, 1991 (Oliver, , 1992 . Thus, heterogeneity in institutional elements can play a role in promoting divergent change that is primarily complementary to the role of local markets: while local market forces motivate organizations to find alternative templates, heterogeneity in institutional elements makes these searches acceptable and successful.
Heterogeneity in institutional elements is more likely to occur to the extent that an organizational field has a fragmented structure of decision making, in which there are multiple and uncoordinated sources of authority and influence (Scott and Meyer, 1983 Greenwood and Hinings, 1996; Hoffman, 1999) . In such fields, organizations that are motivated to make divergent changes due to market pressures have the opportunity to do so, even if it means that they are abandoning a template that had been institutionalized across the field (Oliver, 1991 (Oliver, , 1992 Ocasio, 1995) . Due to lack of central control or coordination in heterogeneous institutional environments, however, regulative, normative, and cognitive elements each play an independent and distinctive role in influencing divergent organizational change (Scott, 1995 Legislation that promotes and limits competition. Government regulation and policy also affect divergent change by increasing or decreasing the level of competition that organizations face in local markets (Fligstein, 1996) . Strong competition motivates organizations to consider divergent change, while weak competition makes such change unnecessary. Government policy promotes competition through antitrust laws that aim to prevent or break up monopolies among existing firms (Dobbin and Dowd, 1997) . For example, laws may reduce barriers to entry so that firms that are new to a market can challenge established ones (Fligstein, 1990 ; Kelly and Amburgey, 1991; Dobbin and Dowd, 1997). In contrast, policies can weaken competition by regulating several aspects of markets, including the production of goods and services, prices, and labor wages. The effect of such anticompetition policies is to reduce organizations' uncertainty about resources and provide them with a stable market environment, thus reinforcing the viability of current templates and decreasing the need to make divergent changes (Fligstein, 1996). We hypothesize:
H6a: Pro-competition regulation will promote divergent organizational change.
H6b: Anti-competitive regulation will inhibit divergent organizational change.
Legislation that affects resources in local markets. Government regulation and policies also play a contradictory role in divergent change by either limiting or increasing resources (especially capital) for organizations, thus either increasing or decreasing both their need and ability to search for, and implement, alternative templates (Fligstein, 1996 ; Dobbin and Dowd, 1997; Wade, Swaminathan, and Saxon, 1998). Policies inhibit divergent change to the extent that they increase resources that flow directly to organizations to support their current templates. Dobbin and Dowd (1997) argued, for example, that the state of Massachusetts provided so much capital support for railroads in the 1 800s that owners' concerns about competition were mitigated; state and local governments were ready to contribute funds to railroads that could not meet their expenses. Policies to increase organizations' resources work in a variety of ways, ranging from direct grants and loans (as for the Chrysler corporation in the 1 980s) to legislation that reduces regulatory demands that are costly for organizations to meet. In contrast, government policies can promote divergent change by providing resources and financial incentives intended to stimulate and support organizations' searches for and implementation of alternative templates. In the post-cold-war era, for example, legislative initiatives provided resources to firms in the U.S. defense industry that would enable them to make divergent changes, thus saving jobs that might be lost due to lack of demand for military products. Thus, we expect: H7a: Legislation that provides resources to support current organizational templates will inhibit divergent organizational change.
H7b: Legislation that provides resources to support organizations' use of alternative templates will promote divergent change.
Norms and values. From among the many norms and values that characterize institutional environments, the most important to divergent organizational change are those that make such change acceptable to actors who own and govern organizations. These actors have the authority and power to make divergent change occur. Norms about property rights are critical because they not only specify who owns organizational assets (public vs. private ownership) but also shape the extent to which these owners can, and will, use these assets to make divergent changes (Campbell and Lindberg, 1990) . Similarly, norms about governance are critical because they specify which actors, other than owners, will influence strategic decisions, such as those to engage in divergent change (Fligstein, 1996) . Divergent change is more likely to occur if it is supported by an organization's owners and board members, who have the authority and power to make substantial changes in an organizational template (Selznick, 1949 ).
Norms about property rights define who owns or has claims on firms' assets and profits (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980) . The more that property rights in an organizational field consist of public rather than private ownership of firm assets, the less likely it is that divergent organizational change will occur. Public ownership means that all citizens of a given community, state, or nation have legal claims on an organization's assets and profits; these citizens also hold responsibility for financial losses. Thus, public ownership diffuses both the costs and benefits of organizational performance and, as a result, creates inertia rather than support for change (Meyer and Zucker, 1990) . Further, publicly owned organizations typically are founded to meet certain communi-684/ASQ, December 2000 ty needs that profit-seeking organizations have failed to address. These organizations thus find it difficult to use public assets for purposes other than those stated in their original charter. Private non-profit organizations have a similar role in our society.
In contrast, for-profit owners have the right to use profits and assets as they see fit. In fact, for-profit owners have a legal responsibility to protect assets, regardless of prior commitments of these resources. For-profit owners are less concerned about meeting an organization's mission than they are in generating profits. Faced with market pressures, these owners will be likely to abandon traditional goals and commitments and exercise their right to use assets for other business opportunities. Thus, we expect:
H8: Public and private non-profit organizations are less likely to make divergent changes than for-profit organizations.
Governance norms play an important part in promoting divergent organizational change because they specify how firms should be organized, including what roles superordinate authorities, such as boards, should play in decision making (Fligstein, 1996) . Governance norms that specify central control of complex organizations will promote divergent change among the various units or divisions that belong to such organizations. This is because central control weakens the importance, meaning, and identity of subunits, making it possible for superordinate authorities to view them as sets of capacities that need to be managed for the good of the firm as a whole (Davis, Diekmann, and Tinsley, 1994; Douglas, 1986) . This view increases the chances that divergent change will occur in organizational units that face adversity. We hypothesize: H9: Organizations that are members of multidivisional firms are more likely to make divergent changes.
Cognitive models of divergent change. Cognitive elements promote divergent change by providing models of such change for organizational decision makers to imitate. Organizations that adopt alternative templates provide cognitive models of divergent change that spread in an organizational field through mimicry. Neo-institutional theorists argue that organizations often mimic other organizations' behavior, especially under conditions of uncertainty (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Goodrick and Salancik, 1996). Results from several empirical studies support the view that mimetic behavior promotes organizational changes that are similar to the divergent change we examine here. Greve (1995 Greve ( , 1996 found evidence of mimicry in analyses of radio stations that abandoned their strategies and stations that adopted new market positions. Similarly, Haveman (1993) showed that savings and loan associations imitated the strategies of large and profitable associations by entering new markets. Divergent change occurs in part because organizations with similar resource needs cannot easily co-exist in the same markets. Thus, an organization is not likely to imitate other organizations that make divergent changes in its local market area because the need for such change is greatly reduced when neighbors have already made it (Greve, 1995) . Rather, organizations will imitate other organizations that face a similar or equivalent pattern of market and institutional forces (Burt, 1987 (Burt, , 1992 . For example, an organization that faced state policies that were similar to those of a focal organization, and responded with a divergent change, would provide a relevant model for such change. In this case, imitation could be highly pragmatic (Kraatz and Moore, 1998). Thus, we hypothesize: H10: Organizations are more likely to make divergent changes to the extent that they have nonlocal models of such change in organizations that faced similar market and institutional forces.
Divergent Change among Rural Hospitals
Institutional pressures. The health care field in the U.S. has long been characterized by institutional pressures that are both strong and heterogeneous (Stevens, 1989) . All branches of the federal government make decisions that affect the entire health care field. Local and state governments also exercise authority to regulate health care providers (Carroll, Delacroix, and Goodstein, 1988) . This fragmented structure of authority makes it possible for various actors to pass laws to meet particular needs and, importantly, means that regulations are, at best, uncoordinated and, at worst, inconsistent or conflicting (Alexander and Scott, 1984) . This study focuses on rural hospitals because rural communities place particularly strong institutional pressures on their hospitals. If a rural hospital closes or changes its mix of services, community members may lose access to vital health care services. Rural hospitals also are often their communities' major employers; their failure may mean the loss of jobs and income for the community. Finally, hospitals have important symbolic meaning in rural communities; they are a source of pride that erodes with hospital closure or identity changes.
Effect of Medicare cuts. The 1980s marked the beginning of a new era that shifted focus from increasing access to health care, as marked by the passage of Medicare and Medicaid legislation in the 1960s, to controlling costs (Scott et al., 2000) . Several years of double-digit increases in prices threatened the economic interests of actors who pay for health care; in response, they initiated policies and practices to control costs.1 In 1984, Medicare became the first major payer to try to control hospital costs by moving from paying all "usual and reasonable" fees that hospitals charged for a particular service to paying a fixed fee for each service. This key change in Medicare payment policy had significant financial and market effects for rural hospitals (Bazzoli, 1995) . Hospitals received reduced cash payments for services, which cut their budgets and contributed to cash-flow problems. Hospitals tried to compensate by increasing their patient and service volume, which, in turn, created more competition for patients. Though market pressures might have been relatively low in rural health care prior to 1984, these pressures increased with Medicare reform. acute inpatient care-and converts all of its capacity to become a provider of other kinds of health care, either outpatient care (e.g., ambulatory care clinic) or specialty inpatient care (e.g., nursing homes) (Alexander, D'Aunno, and Succi, 1996) . Rural hospital conversion is a divergent organizational change for several reasons. First, conversion means that the "hospital" template is discontinued. The hospital template consists of two distinctive capacities: (1) to perform certain technical, medical procedures and (2) to allow patients to recover from acute episodes of health problems or procedures for a short stay (up to several days). Conversion changes one or both of these core features. The capacity to perform technical medical procedures (all surgical procedures) is lost when a hospital converts entirely to either a long-term care facility (a nursing home) or to a provider of non-acute care, such as mental health or drug abuse treatment. The capacity to allow short stays of residential care is lost when a hospital converts entirely to an outpatient care provider. To eliminate the physicians, technology, and services that define a hospital is a radical change, not just an incremental one, as is involved when a hospital specializes, for example, by using some beds to provide long-term care for the elderly.
Second, the hospital template has been highly institutionalized across the entire health care field for decades (Stevens, 1989) . In all states, for an organization that provides health care to be termed a hospital it must meet certain legislatively defined standards, such as having the capacity to provide care by licensed professionals for 24 hours per day, having state-licensed physicians and equipment to perform surgery, or operating an emergency unit for 24 hours per day with at least one physician staff member. Eliminating the services and medical staff that define a "hospital" means that a health care provider is legally no longer a hospital. Finally, when the required services and medical staff that define a hospital are eliminated, other groups recognize that the identity of the hospital has changed.
METHOD
Sample This study's unit of analysis is the individual hospital. The study sample consisted of all non-specialty, community hospitals that were at risk for divergent change (conversion) during the study period. These included hospitals operating in rural areas from 1984 through 1991 and those hospitals that were founded during the study period or that may have exited the population of rural hospitals through mergers and consolidations. We used the broadest possible definition of rural: any locale outside a metropolitan statistical area (MSA). The sample excluded hospitals that operated in rural areas at the outset of the study period but were subsequently incorporated into an MSA. The sample also excluded rural hospitals that had no competitors within 35 miles; we could not test hypotheses about local market competition with these isolated hospitals. We merged data from these sources to construct a pooled, cross-sectional analysis file. The data set contained annual observations on hospitals from 1984 through 1991 in a hospital-year format. Hospitals in the sample were assigned observations for all variables for each year of the study period. Those hospitals that entered the sample after 1984 or exited prior to 1991 were assigned observations only for the years they were operational during the study period. Because predictors of hospital conversion were unlikely to exercise instantaneous effects, and to enhance causal explanation, all predictors were lagged by one year in the analysis. Thus, the data set consisted of seven years of observations, equivalent to 14,446 hospital-years. Table 1 shows the measures for all study variables.
Dependent Variable
Conversion means that a rural hospital changed to provide other types of health care services, and these included outpatient facilities and specialized inpatient facilities (long-term care, substance abuse). We classified community hospitals that closed but reopened as health care providers within one year of closure as conversions. This decision assumes that conversions are often not instantaneous events but require changing the hospital to fulfill its new role. If the time span from closure to reopening as a health care facility was greater than one year, however, the event was classified as a closure. We used a two-step process to produce a complete, validated inventory of conversion in the population of rural hospitals over the study period. First, we compiled an initial inventory of conversion events by comparing annual changes in hospital status using the AHA annual surveys (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) 1990) . Thus, hospitals located in areas with lower population density were assigned a larger radius and a larger market area than hospitals in areas with higher population density.
To calculate a radius for each hospital's market area, we limited radii to a range between 10 and 35 miles. We selected the 10-mile lower bound because it represents the average of two distances (1 5 and 5 miles) generally considered as the radii of urban hospital markets (Luft and Maerki, 1984 Following structural inertia theory (Baum, 1996) , we examined the effects of organization age and size on divergent change; older and larger organizations might be less likely to engage in divergent change. Our measure of size, number of beds set up and staffed for use, has the advantage of capturing the actual number of beds that hospitals are using, as opposed to the number of beds they are licensed to use. We measured age as the number of years since the hospital's founding. Table 2 shows means, standard deviations, and correlations for all study variables.
Model Estimation
We used discrete-time event history analysis (McCullagh and Nelder, 1983), which can be used to estimate the rate of occurrence for a particular event, compared with all nonevent observations (e.g., conversion versus non-conversions). Discrete-time event history analysis offers two other advantages. First, it adjusts for right-censored observations: observations that were truncated due to merger and those that continued to operate as community hospitals after the end of the study period (Yamaguchi, 1991) . Second, this approach is appropriate for use with time-varying covariates and categorical dependent variables that might produce specification error if modeled with linear regression techniques.
To assess the effects of time on risk of rural hospital conversion, we included a series of dummy variables representing each year of the study in the model. Interactions between these dummy variables and all other covariates were added to the model to test the assumption that effects of covariates on conversion are time-invariant. Results (not shown) indicate that time interactions were not statistically significant. Because these findings suggest that covariate effects were not dependent on history, time-covariate interaction terms were subsequently excluded from the model.
Adjustments for repeated observations. Longitudinal data consisting of repeated observations of the covariates and outcomes for the same subjects can introduce bias due to correlation among the repeated observations (Zeger and Liang, 1986) . We used generalized estimating equations (GEE) to estimate the modeJ to correct for potential bias 693/ASO, December 2000 caused by such correlation (Karim and Zeger, 1988). GEE adjusts for repeated observations by estimating within-subject correlation separately from the regression parameters, yielding consistent estimates of the regression coefficients without rigorous assumptions about the actual correlation among the subjects' observations (Zeger and Liang, 1986 ). Table 3 shows results from event history analyses using GEE to test our hypotheses. 
RESULTS

Market Forces
There is no support for H1, that organizations operating in local markets with lower demand levels would be more likely to engage in divergent change (see columns 2 and 4). None of the demand measures (population in the area, percent of population over age 65, per capita income in the market) were significantly related to divergent change. Results do support H2, that the closer the geographic distance between an organization and its closest competitor, the more likely it is that a focal organization would make a divergent change. There is a statistically significant relationship between geographic distance to a competitor and hospital conversion. We also argued that norms concerning governance and property rights in an organizational field influence divergent change (Fligstein, 1996) , and the results support this view. Hospitals that are members of multihospital systems lose local governance. This shift in governance means that the interests of individual hospitals become secondary to the interests of the system as a whole, which system boards have a legal obligation to support. Membership in multihospital systems thus makes it more likely that divergent change will occur in individual hospitals to meet the needs of their parent systems. The results also show that public hospitals are less likely to convert than privately owned nonprofit hospitals. Public hospitals limit owners' property rights-there are no profits recognized in publicly owned organizations, and taxpayers share both assets and financial losses. Thus, the combination of local control and diffuse, public ownership of assets and profits makes it very difficult for divergent change to occur. These results are consistent with our broader argument that institutional elements can either promote or inhibit divergent organizational change.
Finally, we argued that organizations would mimic models of divergent change that are provided by their nonlocal, but equivalent peers; the results support this view. In states that already have high rates of rural hospital conversion, more conversion is likely. Organizations are likely to mimic behavior that they can observe among peers that face similar institutional and resource environments (Greve, 1998; Martin, Swaminathan, and Mitchell, 1998).
Despite the relative strength of the results, we are cautious about making generalizations from this study. We argued above that inconsistent results from the few previous studies of divergent change could be due to the particular organizational fields that were examined. Following this logic, this study's results may hold only for a particular context. We examined a fragmented organizational field at a time when traditional organizational forms and practices were called into question due to the steeply rising costs of health care. It is under this combination of conditions that we find that both market and institutional forces can promote divergent organizational change. Further, we examined a relatively brief time period (seven years) in a field with a long and complex history (Starr, 1982; Stevens, 1989 (1996) found no decline in the performance of liberal arts colleges that added professional degree programs to their curricula, the change we examined is more extensive. Moreover, the change we examined involved organizations moving from what ecologists might consider generalists (hospitals) to specialists (e.g., nursing homes) (Baum, 1996) . To what extent do generalists perform well in their new areas of specialization? Does this change merely stall organizational demise? Further, this study raises questions about the processes involved in divergent change. Because we used national survey data, we could not examine such processes, as scholars had done in the original institutional school (Selznick, 1996) . Certain approaches to divergent change, such as gaining the support of a range of stakeholders, may affect post-change performance.
The results also indicate that institutional theory can provide at least a partial account for divergent organizational change. This account includes several elements. First, we must recognize that organizational fields vary in their structure of decision making and in the strength of their institutional and market forces (Dacin, 1997; Hoffman, 1999) . Researchers need to examine these factors in studies of organizational change (Hinings and Greenwood, 1996) . Second, we should hold open the possibility that institutional actors have multiple and often inconsistent interests (Meyer and Rowan, 1977) . In this study, state legislatures produced several policies that aimed to promote or inhibit change among rural hospitals (Mueller, 1992) . In some cases, legislatures also passed laws that circumvented markets and provided rural hospitals directly with funds either to support them in their current state or to support divergent change. Other actors, especially the boards of multihospital systems and publicly owned hospitals, worked either to change rural hospitals or keep them the same.
Third, institutional analyses of organizational change should recognize that actors are not necessarily bound by history or taken-for-granted practices (Fligstein, 1997 
